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I. INTRODUCTION
Together with issues of equitable distribution, progressive courts
are attempting to address hidden inequities in alimony awards. While
alimony and equitable distribution of marital assets are now being
addressed by the courts as separate issues, recent decisions are enlight-
ening as well as important. They provide progressive and creative
mechanisms by which an alimony analysis and an equitable distribution
analysis can be used by courts to fashion a financial division of family
resources to achieve a fair and meaningful award of alimony, as well
as a fair distribution of the marital assets.
Many courts are fashioning alimony awards and dividing marital
assets in such a way that both parties are left after the divorce with a
standard of living as close as possible to the predivorce standard of
living. These courts are focusing on alimony and equitable distribution
as they relate to long-term marriages and situations in which one
spouse is restricted to a certain earning capacity or has failed to devel-
* Segal & Davis. L.C., Charleston, W. Va.
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op his or her own earning capacity because he or she has been devot-
ed to parental or homemaker duties.
California, as is often the case, addressed this issue early. In the
case of In re Marriage of Rosan,' the California Court of Appeal pro-
vided justification for considering the relative earning capacities of the
parties and their postdivorce standard of living. The Rosan court said:
In a long marriage during which the wife has not taken outside em-
ployment but has devoted herself to wifely and parental duties, the wife
has not only failed to develop her own earning capacity, she has presum-
ably contributed to the development of the husband's earning capacity. In
many, if not in most, cases the established employment or earning capacity
of the husband constitutes the most valuable economic asset of the parties.
While this economic attribute is not of such a character as will permit its
division as property, it is not to be ignored in considering the problem of
continuing support.2
Justice Richard Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has likewise acknowledged that in most divorces, women do
not obtain anything of economic value.' Only fourteen percent of all
divorced women are awarded alimony. "Of the women who are award-
ed alimony, only 2/3 receive any actual payment, and the median
payments for those who receive it is only $2,850.00 per year."4
Various statutes have been enacted to ensure the enforcement of
alimony awards. Examples of such statutes include the withholding
provisions of section 48-2-15b of the West Virginia Code and the
requirement in section 48-2-17 that abstracts of alimony orders be
recorded. Yet, despite these statutes, once alimony is awarded, the
collection process often remains problematic.
As indicated in section 48-2-15 of the West Virginia Code, alimo-
ny can take many different forms. The three major types of alimony
that currently exist in West Virginia are reimbursement alimony, reha-
bilitative alimony, and permanent alimony.
1. 101 Cal. Rptr. 295 (Ct. App. 1972).
2. 1& at 304 (citation omitted).
3. RICHARD NEELY, THE DIVORCE DECISION: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN CONSEQUENC-
ES OF ENDING A MARRIAGE 26 (1984).
4. Id. at 26-29.
470 [Vol. 95:469
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HI. TYPES oF ALIMONY
A. Reimbursement Alimony
Reimbursement alimony is the newest form of alimony in many
states, including West Virginia.5 In Hoak v. Hoak,6 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals awarded Rebecca Hoak reimbursement
alimony as compensation for her work and financial contribution to the
professional education of her husband. Her economic contribution was
made with the expectation of achieving a higher standard of living for
her family, yet she failed to realize that expectation due to the
couple's divorce. In acknowledging that reimbursement alimony is a
financial adjustment aimed at repaying the working spouse who en-
hanced the "career spouse's" income-earning ability, the court demon-
strated the necessity, fairness, and equity in requiring spouses to share
equally in the benefits and burdens produced by a marriage
Thus, in an effort to compensate the supporting spouse when a
marriage is of insufficient duration for the parties to accumulate sub-
stantial marital assets, the court focused on the alimony statutes, decid-
ing that an award of some form of alimony in such situations is re-
quired because there is no marital estate of significance to divide be-
tween the spouses. The West Virginia court made the following state-
ment concerning reimbursement alimony in Lambert v. Lambert:8 "The
decision to make such an award will depend on numerous factors, to
be determined by the trial judge, including the degree to which the
equitable distribution of marital property, once fully ascertained, al-
ready reflects such a reimbursement."9
In another case where the West Virginia Supreme Court consid-
ered the issue of reimbursement alimony, Chamberlain v. Chamber-
5. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (NJ. 1982); DeLarosa v. DeLarosa, 309
N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
6. 370 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1988).
7. Itt at 478.
8. 376 S.E.2d 331 (W. Va. 1988).
9. Id at 333 (emphasis added); see also W. VA. CODE § 48-2-16(b)(5) (1992).
1992-93]
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lain,"° the court affirmed the award to a husband of sixty percent of
the marital assets as his share of the marital property instead of award-
ing him reimbursement alimony for his contribution to his wife's law
degree. The trial court had found that the facts of the case did not
support an award of reimbursement alimony to Mr. Chamberlain be-
cause the court could not determine that Mr. Chamberlain had con-
tributed more to Mrs. Chamberlain's income-earning ability than Mrs.
Chamberlain had contributed to Mr. Chamberlain's military career.
Thus, the court concluded that each party had sufficiently contributed
to the income-earning ability of the other so that reimbursement alimo-
ny was not warranted.1
The authority for awarding reimbursement alimony in West Vir-
ginia is derived from subsections 48-2-16(b)(4) and (b)(16) of the
West Virginia Code. This statute requires consideration of the respec-
tive income-eaming abilities of each of the parties, as well other fac-
tors that the court deems just and appropriate. 12
Courts throughout the country which have awarded reimbursement
alimony have issued strikingly similar opinions. These courts are rec-
ognizing that it is inequitable for one to sacrifice his or her standard
of living in order to enable the other spouse to attain job advancement
and a related increase in earning ability and then receive no compensa-
tion for such sacrifice. Equity demands that each spouse should leave
the marriage in a similar financial position.
10. 383 S.E.2d 100 (W. Va. 1989).
11. Ict at 103.
12. The statute states:
The court shall consider the following factors in determining the amount of alimo-
ny .. . .
(4) The income earning abilities of each of the parties, based on such factors
as educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of
absence from the job market and custodial responsibilities for children;
(16) Such other factors as the court deems necessary or appropriate to consid-
er in order to arrive at a fair and equitable grant of alimony . ...
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-16(b) (1992).
[Vol. 95:469
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Thus, reimbursement alimony coupled with equitable distribution is
a good solution for short-term marriages in which there has been little
accumulation of marital assets. However, reimbursement alimony is
improper in marriages of a longer duration involving older parties. An
alternative type of alimony is appropriate in such cases.
B. Rehabilitative Alimony
Rehabilitative alimony is generally used to encourage a dependent
spouse to become self-supporting by providing alimony for a limited
period of time during which the dependent spouse can obtain employ-
ment. 13 As the commentators suggest, the primary goal of rehabilita-
tive alimony is to fairly allocate the benefits and the burdens of the
marriage. 1
4
Based upon the criteria outlined in section 48-2-16(b) of the West
Virginia Code, even if a dependent spouse is college educated, alimony
may still be appropriate.15 Courts must consider child care and cus-
13. Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73, 76 (W. Va. 1984); see also Nancy A. Veith,
Note, Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In Need of a More Comprehensive Approach to Miti-
gating Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 493 (1978).
14. Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for
Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253, 260-61 (1989).
15. The statutory factors are:
In cases where the parties to an action commenced under the provisions of this
article have not executed a separation agreement, or have executed an agreement,
which is incomplete or insufficient to resolve the outstanding issues between the
parties, or where the court finds the separation agreement of the parties not to be
fair and reasonable or clear and unambiguous, the court shall proceed to resolve
the issues outstanding between the parties. The court shall consider the following
factors in determining the amount of alimony, child support or separate mainte-
nance, if any, to be ordered under the provisions of sections thirteen and fifteen
[§§ 48-2-13 and 48-2-15] of this article, as a supplement to or in lieu of the
separation agreement:
(1) The length of time the parties were married;
(2) The period of time during the marriage when the parties actually lived
together as husband and wife;
(3) The present employment income and other recurring earnings of each
party from any source;
(4) The income-earning abilities of each of the parties, based upon such fac-
tors as educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length
5
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todial responsibilities when determining alimony awards.1 6 The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has highlighted the following addi-
tional factors that must considered by courts when deciding whether
rehabilitative alimony is appropriate in a specific case:
A court should not relieve a supporting spouse from the duty to maintain
the dependent spouse and children by providing only rehabilitative alimony
simply because the dependent spouse may have the skills necessary to
facilitate a return to the job market. Instead, the court should consider the
following factors before opting for rehabilitative alimony over permanent
alimony: (1) the dependent spouse's position in the home at the time of
the divorce; (2) the age of the children; (3) the parties' income at the time
of the divorce and their potential income in the future; and (4) the benefit,
where economics permit, of the dependent spouse remaining in the home
to care for the children."7
of absence from the job market and custodial responsibilities for children;
(5) The distribution of marital property to be made under the terms of a
separation agreement or by the court under the provisions of section thirty-two [§
48-2-32] of this article, insofar as the distribution affects or will affect the earn-
ings of the parties and their ability to pay or their need to receive alimony, child
support or separate maintenance;
(6) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional condition of each party;
(7) The educational qualifications of each party;
(8) The likelihood that the party seeking alimony, child support or separate
maintenance can substantially increase his or her income-earning abilities within a
reasonable time by acquiring additional education or training;
(9) The anticipated expense of obtaining the education and training described
in subdivision (8) above;
(10) The costs of educating minor children;
(11) The costs of providing health care for each of the parties and their
minor children;
(12) The tax consequences to each party;
(13) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because said
party will be the custodian of a minor child or children, to seek employment
outside the home;
(14) The financial need of each party;
(15) The legal obligations of each party to support himself or herself and to
support any other person; and
(16) Such other factors as the court deems necessary or appropriate to consid-
er in order to arrive at a fair and equitable grant of alimony, child support or
separate maintenance.
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-16(b) (1992).
16. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-16(b)(4) (1992).
17. Wyant v. Wyant, 400 S.E.2d 869, 875 (W. Va. 1990). The court has also ac-
[Vol. 95:469
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In light of these factors, rehabilitative alimony is primarily intended
for young spouses who are still able to obtain gainful employment. 8
Other factors that the courts should consider are the person's health
and actual earning capacity once he or she re-enters the job market.19
An example of the type of case which would support an award of
rehabilitative alimony is Cross v. Cross.2" The West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals found rehabilitative alimony appropriate for a
middle-aged wife with a college education. However, it is important to
note that in Cross, the court left open the possibility of permanent
alimony if Mrs. Cross was unable to become employed.2'
Using the criteria described above, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held, in Queen v. Queen,2 2 that the trial court erred
by awarding Mrs. Queen rehabilitative alimony instead of permanent
alimony.2' Mrs. Queen was fifty-one years of age at the termination
of the thirty-three year marriage. 24 Mrs. Queen's net annual income
was $6,144 while Mr. Queen's annual income was $29,000.25 During
the marriage, Mrs. Queen had been a homemaker and the primary
caretaker for the couple's two children.26 The court considered her
age and the disparity in income between the two spouses, as well as
the fact that Mrs. Queen might not be able to obtain employment,
even though she was willing to try.27 Thus, rehabilitative alimony was
inappropriate in this case. The court has also indicated that it will not
accept an award of rehabilitative alimony payable in periodic payments
when a lump sum award is accessible and more appropriate.28
knowledged that alimony and child support are within the sound discretion of the trial court
and that the appropriate standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion. Luff v. Luff,
329 S.E.2d 100, 102 (W. Va. 1985).
18. Bettinger v. Bettinger, 396 S.E.2d 709, 723 (W. Va. 1990).
19. Kapfer v. Kapfer, 419 S.E.2d 464, 467 (W. Va. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-1-
16(b)(6) & (b)(8) (1992).
20. Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449 (WT. Va. 1987).
21. Id at 452.
22. Queen v. Queen, 375 S.E.2d 592 (W. Va. 1988).
23. I& at 594.
24. IA at 593.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 1& at 594.
28. Rogers v. Rogers, 405 S.E.2d 235, 241 (W. Va. 1991).
1992-93]
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Another interesting analysis in the area of rehabilitative alimony
was utilized by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
McGraw v. McGraw.29 The court upheld the trial court's ruling that
precluded a husband's basic railroad retirement annuity from being
considered divisible marital property. The court acknowledged that the
Railway Retirement Act expressly precludes from consideration as
divisible marital property the basic railroad retirement annuity.3" Yet,
when fashioning the alimony award to Mrs. McGraw, the court struc-
tured the alimony award so as to bridge the gap between the time of
the divorce and Mrs. McGraw's future eligibility for retirement bene-
fits. Mrs. McGraw argued that the fixed-period alimony award was
inadequate. She asserted that her alimony should not stop when she
becomes eligible for retirement benefits at age sixty-two. In rejecting
her argument, the court reasoned that she was employed and that the
respective incomes of Mr. and Mrs. McGraw were relatively similar.
The court thus used rehabilitative alimony to equalize the parties'
incomes until Mrs. McGraw's retirement benefits actually began. By
utilizing the statutory factors contained in section 48-2-16(b) of the
West Virginia Code, the court reached an equitable result.
Another factor used by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals in making alimony determinations is overtime pay. In Stevens v.
Stevens,31 the court recognized that overtime pay could be used in
considering total income for purposes of determining child support.
The court followed the practice of other jurisdictions32 and held that
overtime pay, when obtained with some degree of regularity, should be
considered when determining total employment earnings. Similarly, in
Rexroad v. Rexroad,33 the court stated:
With regard to the inclusion of overtime pay in calculating earnings,
our domestic relations law provides for the payment of alimony and child
29. 411 S.E.2d 256 (W. Va. 1991).
30. 45 U.S.C. § 231m(a) (1988). The Railway Retirement Act provides benefits equiv-
alent to those under the Social Security Act. 45 U.S.C. § 231n-1 (1990).
31. 412 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 1991).
32. Jones v. Jones, 472 N.W.2d 782 (S.D. 1991); In re Marriage of Vashler, 600 P.2d
208 (Mont. 1979); Reyna v. Reyna, 398 N.E.2d 641 (Il. App. Ct. 1979); Goetsch v.
Goetsch, 159 N.W.2d 748 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968).
33. 414 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1992).
476 [Vol. 95:469
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support "to be ordinarily made from a party's employment income and
other recurring earnings." . . . Moreover.... the legislature has listed the
factors to be considered in making a determination of the appropriate
amount of alimony and child support. This list includes "[t]he present
employment income and other recurring earnings of each party from any
source."3
Not only did the court calculate overtime pay for purposes of deter-
mining the husband's total income, but the court also remanded the
case to the trial court because the alimony award was inadequate. 5
Mrs. Rexroad had an annual net income of $10,000 while Mr. Rexroad
had a gross annual income of $42,000.36 However, the trial court,
upon the recommendation of the family law master, had awarded Mrs.
Rexroad only $50 per week 7 The court inferred that the family law
master had considered the fault of Mrs. Rexroad in ordering such a
small amount of alimony.38 The court went on to rule that for inequi-
table conduct to be a bar to alimony, the conduct must be substan-
tial. 39
In further clarifying the issue of fault and the consideration that
needs to be given to fault in determining an alimony award, the court
reviewed its decisions in Peremba v. Peremba, Haynes v.
Haynes,41 and CharIton v. Charlton.42 It concluded that in light of
the recent definitional language in section 48-2-15(i) of the West Vir-
ginia Code, "[W]e believe that the legislature intended to adopt a
uniform standard with regard to the role of fault as it bears on alimo-
ny."' 43 The court also stated:
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15(i) bars a person from alimony in only three in-
stances: (1) where the party has committed adultery; (2) where, subsequent
34. Id. at 459 (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2-15(a)
& 48-2-16(b)(3) (1992)) (alteration in original).
35. Id at 458.
36. I& at 459.
37. It at 458, 459.
38. Id at 459.
39. Id at 460-61.
40. 304 S.E.2d 880 (W. Va. 1983).
41. 264 S.E.2d 474 (W. Va. 1980).
42. 413 S.E.2d 911 (W. Va. 1991).
43. Rexroad, 414 S.E.2d at 461.
1992-93]
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to the marriage, the party has been convicted of a felony, which conviction
is final; and (3) where the party has actually abandoned or deserted the
other spouse for six months. In those other situations where fault is con-
sidered in awarding alimony under W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15(i), the "court
[or family law master] shall consider and compare the fault or misconduct
of either or both of the parties and the effect of such fault or misconduct
as a contributing factor to the deterioration of the marital relationship.""
Based upon the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that only in egre-
gious situations should the courts consider denying an award of alimo-
ny. Fair consideration of the statutory factors listed in section 48-2-
16(b) of the West Virginia Code will guide the courts to equitable
awards of alimony.
C. Permanent Alimony
Permanent alimony takes many forms. The alimony statutes in
West Virginia list factors for the courts to consider when they are
making determinations of permanent alimony. Courts often use these
alimony factors not only in awarding alimony, but also in making an
equitable distribution of marital assets. However, in West Virginia, as
in most states, separate statutes address the issues of equitable distribu-
tion and alimony.45 This indicates that, as a general matter, alimony
and equitable distribution are separate issues that should be indepen-
dently adjudged.46 Excess judicial spillover between the two concepts
can result in inequitable alimony awards. For example, how is the
form and amount of the alimony determined when a husband is also
required to pay the wife $2,000 per month for a period of ten years as
part of the equitable distribution of the family business? The commen-
tators see these overlapping issues as confusing, but more distressing is
that the laundry list of factors contained in both the equitable distribu-
tion statutes and the alimony statutes allows judges to emphasize
44. Id at 461 (citing W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4(a)(1) to (a)(3) (1992) (footnotes omitted)
(alteration in original).
45. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2-16(b) & 48-2-32(c) (1992).
46. However, the West Virginia Legislature has mandated that alimony determinations




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss2/7
ALIMONY & EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
whichever particular factors that appeal to them or support their deci-
sion.47 Unfortunately, more often than not, the long-term homemakers
and caregivers receive their equitable distribution of marital assets in
the same proportion as the income-producing spouse. However, those
very same dollars are then utilized to decrease, or offset, a permanent
alimony award, so that the homemaker spouse remains at a severe eco-
nomic disadvantage with a diminished standard of living when com-
pared to the career spouse.
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is very
progressive in awarding permanent alimony based upon the factors
listed in the code, the court is deficient in its review of permanent
support awards in relation to the standard of living established during
marriage. Permanent alimony is based upon the factors contained in
section 48-2-16(b) of the West Virginia Code. This statute gives the
courts broad discretion in fashioning alimony awards. The alimony
statute contemplates a disparity in income, education, and age, as well
as many other factors which are intended to provide for a fair award
of alimony to the nonsupporting spouse that will allow him or her to
maintain, as closely as possible, the same standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage. Thus, an award of alimony is appropriate to cor-
rect the inequities between the parties' respective financial positions
and earning capacities upon divorce.
In reviewing the standard of living analysis, the more progressive
courts have acknowledged this critical function of permanent alimony.
For example, in the Klein v. Klein,4 the Supreme Court of Vermont
stated:
The function of alimony ... in most cases, is to accomplish the divorce
with the least possible social and financial hardship and disruption. This is
made clear by the statements in cases and statutes that alimony should,
within the limits of the husband's resources, be such as to maintain the
wife's standard of living as nearly as possible at the same level she en-
joyed during the marriage. The husband, having entered into one of the
strongest and most fundamental relationships known to the law, must con-
47. Keith Hawkins, On Legal Decision Making, 43 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 1161, 1186
(1986).
48. 555 A.2d 382 (Vt. 1988).
1992-93] 479
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tinue to bear its financial burden where he can reasonably do so and
where it is necessary in order to prevent a relatively greater hardship to
the wife. Divorce inevitably produces painful alterations in the lives of
spouses. A major function of alimony is to reduce its financial impact.4
In many cases that call for an award of permanent alimony, the
dependent spouse lacks a college education or has very limited work
experience. The dependent spouse has often dedicated his or her life to
raising the children and supporting the other spouse in his or her
working endeavors. Additionally, permanent alimony is appropriate
when there is no real prospect of a spouse supporting himself or her-
self at or near the standard of living established during the marriage.
Unfairness results, however, when courts use the equitable distribution
of marital assets to satisfy alimony requirements. Equitable distribution
assets are normally nonincome producing; therefore, they are, by defi-
nition, inadequate as spousal support.
In contrast, the spouse in the superior financial position will con-
tinue to increase his or her financial security as a result of the en-
hanced earning powers achieved during the marriage. Simply put, there
seems to be a misconception that the equitable distribution of
nonincome producing property is to be used against, or to offset, an
alimony award. Progressive courts have correctly ruled that such is not
the case. In Larocque v. Larocque, ° the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
stated: "The property division should provide [both spouses] with a
nest egg for retirement or a reserve for emergencies."5
Thus, it becomes abundantly clear that the property division-that
is, equitable distribution-should not be considered in lieu of or as an
offset against a permanent alimony award when the factors outlined in
section 48-2-16(b) are considered. As the commentators indicate, the
length of the marriage is an important factor in determining the appro-
priate amount of permanent alimony. The longer the marriage, the
more the parties have contributed to a joint standard of living. The
longer the marriage, the more both parties have set that standard of
49. Id. at 387.
50. 406 N.W.2d 736 (Wis. 1987).
51. L at 740.
[Vol. 95:469
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living as a measure of their reasonable needs. Finally, the longer the
marriage, the more the earning capacity of the homemaker decreases
while the earning capacity of the working spouse increases.52
III. CURRENT ISSUES
A. Standard of Living Analysis
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has been
progressive in its permanent alimony awards, it has failed to recognize
the connection between permanent alimony and the standard of living
that the parties have become accustomed to during their marriage. For
example, in Bettinger v. Bettinger,3 the court equitably divided the
value of the medical practice, yet awarded Mrs. Bettinger only $2,000
per month as child support and alimony, despite the fact that Dr.
Bettinger was making $100,000 per year at the time of the divorce.5 4
Even though Mrs. Bettinger had been out of the job market for years
and, once divorced, she had no real expectation of ever achieving the
same standard of living on her own that she and her husband had
enjoyed throughout their marriage, the court awarded only rehabilitative
alimony to the physician's wife in Bettinger.
Similarly, in Koppel v. Koppel,55 the parties had been married for
twenty-nine years. Mrs. Koppel, a nurse, had worked while Dr. Koppel
obtained a medical degree. Thereafter, Mrs. Koppel quit work at Dr.
Koppel's request so that she could raise their children. She did not
work throughout their marriage. At the tlme of the parties' divorce,
Dr. Koppel was earning between $76,000 and $78,000 per year. Mrs.
Koppel's earning capacity was estimated to be between $16,000 and
$30,000 per year, depending on overtime work. Yet, the West Virginia
court adopted the family law master's recommendation to award Mrs.
Koppel only $1,000 per month for ten years.
52. Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration
of Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573, 586 (1988).
53. 396 S.E.2d 709 (W. Va. 1990).
54. I at 722.
55. 388 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 1989).
1992-93]
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The alimony of $1,000 per month for ten years was based upon
the length of the marriage, the ages of the parties, the wife's absence
from the job market, and the husband's income as a medical doctor.
Presumably, the court acknowledged that Mrs. Koppel was entitled to
alimony for only ten years because Mrs. Koppel received significant
assets through equitable distribution. Thus, the court substituted an
award of equitable distribution for an adequate alimony award.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, like many courts
across the country, fell into this mental trap, even though the purposes
of alimony and equitable distribution are different. In this area, and
specifically in Koppel, the West Virginia Supreme Court's analysis is
deficient. Dr. Koppel received, as equitable distribution, the same in-
come-producing property as did Mrs. Koppel. Equitable distribution,
however, should be treated primarily as assets set aside for emergen-
cies and retirement.
5 6
Under the standard of living analysis, which attempts to enable
each party to maintain his or her marital standard of living, the parties
should be left in similar financial positions.57 However, in Koppel the
disparity of the parties' income-earning capacity is extreme. Dr.
Koppel's annual income will more than double Mrs. Koppel's through-
out his remaining years of employment. The Koppel decision contra-
venes the intent of the legislature because the court failed to consider
all the alimony factors set forth in section 48-2-16(b) of the West Vir-
ginia Code. Furthermore, the decision is woefully unfair given the
extreme disparity in the income-earning abilities of the respective par-
ties.
56. See supra text accompanying note 51.
57. Although no case specifically addresses the question of when a couple's "standard
of living" should be determined for purposes of alimony calculations, be it separation or
trial, most courts speak only of the standard of living during the marriage. "Standard of
living" is defined as "a minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to
maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2223 (1986). Additionally, an alimony award should, to
the extent possible, "equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards." Rasband
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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In another West Virginia case, Rogers v. Rogers,5 the parties
divorced after sixteen years of marriage. Although Mrs. Rogers had
little or no education and Mr. Rogers was a highly successful attorney,
the court awarded Mrs. Rogers only $254,000 as a lump sum alimony
award. The court again seemed to be avoiding the standard of living
criteria and only provided lip service to the alimony factors outlined in
section 48-2-16(b) of the West Virginia Code.
Most progressive courts, however, carefully apply the standard of
living analysis when they are determining permanent alimony awards.
In In re Marriage of Smith,59 the California Court of Appeal applied
a standard of living analysis in making its decision regarding perma-
nent alimony. Based upon the length of the marriage (ten years) and
the standard of living that the couple had come to enjoy, the court
awarded Mrs. Smith $1,700 per month in permanent alimony. At the
time, Mr. Smith was earning approximately $90,000 per year. The
Smith court acknowledged that in California (as in West Virginia), the
ultimate decision regarding spousal support rests within the court's
broad discretion. However, the court also stated that trial courts must
make alimony decisions within the bounds of reason and must estab-
lish the actual marital standard of living in order to determine a rea-
sonable measure of alimony.6°
Similarly, Utah has established alimony awards based upon the
standard of living which existed during the marriage. The Utah Court
of Appeals has considered both the relevant facts and equitable princi-
ples in making its alimony awards. For example, in Howell v.
Howell,61 the court reversed an alimony award to a wife of only
$1,800 per month even though the wife received $1,363 per month in
child support pursuant to the child support guidelines based upon the
husband's gross income of $10,000 per month. In support of its con-
clusion, the Utah court reasoned:
58. 405 S.E.2d 235 (W. Va. 1991).
59. Smith v. Smith, 274 Cal. Rptr. 911 (Ct. App. 1990).
60. d at 913.
61. 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
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[Sihe is approximately fifty years old, has minimal marketable job skills,
and has spent most of the thirty plus years of the parties' marriage raising
and caring for their five children and their home, presumably with the
concurrence of plaintiff. Her likelihood of achieving significant salary
levels in tile future is slim. The alimony set by the court does not come
close to equalizing the parties' standard of living as of the time of the
divorce, but allows plaintiff a two to four times advantage. We, therefore,
hold that the alimony amount set by the court was clearly erroneous.'
While acknowledging that an exact mathematical equality of income
was not required, the Utah court acknowledged that approximate parity
was necessary to allow each party to be in as equal a financial posi-
tion as possible at the time of the parties' divorce.
While it should not be used as the sole criterion, the standard of
living analysis provides an important basis for determining the amount
of permanent alimony awards because it furnishes a historic benchmark
for determining the reasonableness of an alimony award.63 By utiliz-
ing the factors outlined in section 48-2-16(b) of the West ,Virginia
Code, the West Virginia courts can arrive at reasonable and equitable
figures -for permanent alimony awards. In addition to the alimony
criteria contained in section 48-2-16(b), spousal support guidelines
should be formulated similar to existing child support guidelines.64
Clarifying the factors and supporting them by utilizing the standard of
living analysis for a frame of reference is necessary to make alimony
awards a rational and equitable process in West Virginia. Perhaps a
well-reasoned multiple for determining alimony awards, similar to that
used in child support guidelines is necessary to take the arbitrary
guesswork out of permanent alimony awards. More importantly, a
clearer frame of reference is necessary so that alimony awards are not
decreased, offset, or confused with the principles and results of equita-
ble distribution.
62. Id at 1213 (footnote omitted); see also Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1088
(Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).
63. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 16.4(3), at 648 (2d .ed. 1988).
64. See W. Va. Code § 48A-2-8(a) (1992).
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B. Marital vs. Separate Property
As indicated above, the equitable division of marital assets and its
factors are contained in a separate statute. The provisions which ad-
dress equitable distribution set forth a different standard and employ
different criteria than those used to determine alimony awards and,
therefore, the two issues should be decided independently.
West Virginia is a dual property jurisdiction. That is, property
may be classified as either marital property or separate property. Mari-
tal property includes "[a]ll property and earnings acquired by either
spouse during a marriage... except that marital property shall not
include separate property., 65 Separate property includes property ac-
quired before the marriage; property acquired during marriage in ex-
change for separate property acquired before marriage; property exclud-
ed from marital property by valid agreement of the parties; property
acquired during the marriage by gift, bequest, devise, descent or dis-
tribution; and property acquired during separation.6
In 1987, Professor Krauskopf, although noting that a single piece
of property can have a "dual character" in West Virginia (part separate
and part marital), concluded that application of the theories contained
in the West Virginia statutes present problems of proof in determining
contributions to separate property made during the marriage.67 In es-
sence, when the West Virginia Legislature set forth the definitions of
separate and marital property, it adopted the source-of-funds approach
in classifying property. Thus, a single piece of property could legiti-
mately have a dual character in West Virginia: part separate and part
marital. At least, that was the status of the law in West Virginia until
the decision in Whiting v. Whiting.68
65. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e)(1) (Supp. 1992).
66. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(f)(1)-(5) (Supp. 1992).
67. Joan M. Krauskopf, Classifying Marital and Separate Property-Combinations and
Increase in Value of Separate Property, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 997 (1987); see also Lee
vanEgmond, Toward a More Equitable Distribution of Property Upon Divorce: A Critique
of Recent Developments in the Law of Marital Property in West Virginia, 94 W. VA. L.
REV. 531, 546 (1991-92).
68. 396 S.E.2d 413 (W. Va. 1990).
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In Whiting, the West Virginia Supreme Court stated that, under
section 48-2-32 of the West Virginia Code, equitable distribution of
marital assets is -a three-step process.' The first step is to differenti-
ate between the parties' marital property and separate property. The
second step is to value the marital property. ° The final step in the
equitable distribution process is to divide the marital property between
the parties. 7
1
Mr. Whiting had acquired, at the death of his first wife, her one-
half interest in certain property. Mr. Whiting subsequently remarried
and conveyed title to his property to the new Mrs. Whiting as a joint
tenant. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that trans-
fer of separately-owned property into jointly-owned property changes
the character of the ownership interest in the property transferred. The
change in title to joint ownership changed the nonmarital property to
marital property; the marital property then became subject to equitable
distribution.72 In adopting such a theory, the court noted that many
jurisdictions adhere to the general rule that such a result is in accord
with the partnership concept of marriage, which is the basis for equita-
ble distribution. The court adopted the view of other jurisdictions
which have concluded that the joint titling of what was formerly sepa-
rate property gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of a gift to the
marital estate.73 Transmutation by title has occurred. For example, if
a spouse owning separate property changes the record title to joint
ownership, a presumption is created that the owner of the separate
property intended to give the other spouse a one-half interest in the
property.74
However, according to the West Virginia Code, marital assets are
classified as marital property or separate property based on how and
when the property was acquired, as opposed to its title. For example,
69. Id. at 416.
70. Id. at 417.
71. Id.
72. IM. at 419; see also Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550 (Alaska 1990).
73. See Burgess v. Burgess, 710 P.2d 417 (Alaska 1985); Boyce v. Boyce) 694
S.W.2d 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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marital property includes "[a]ll property and earnings acquired by
either spouse during a marriage ... regardless of the form of owner-
ship"7 5 and separate property includes:
(1) Property acquired by a person before marriage; or
(2) Property acquired by a person during marriage in exchange for sep-
arate property which was acquired before the marriage; or
(3) property acquired by a person during marriage, but excluded from
treatment as marital property by a valid agreement of the parties entered
into before or during the marriage; or
(4) Property acquired by a party during marriage by gift, bequest, devise,
descent or distribution; or
(5) Property acquired by a party during a marriage but after the separation
of the parties and before the granting of a divorce, annulment or decree of
separate maintenance.' 6
Therefore, according to the statutory definition, property is classified as
marital or separate based on how and when it was acquired, not on its
form of ownership.
By enacting section 48-3-10 of the West Virginia Code, the legis-
lature intended to classify property according to its means of acquisi-
tion rather than by its title. The statute requires that, for equitable
distribution purposes, "a gift between spouses must be affirmatively
proved."77 In essence, the legislature indicated that title alone is not
sufficient to prove ownership in a contest between spouses and that
affirmative proof of a gift is required.78 This dual property system
was adopted because of "essentially common-sense extrapolations of
fairness notions and beliefs about spouses' expectations."79
The court in Koontz v. Koontz"° considered section 48-3-10 and
concluded that one spouse's transfer of the title to his or her separate
property to both spouses jointly presumes an intent to make a gift of
75. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e)(1) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
76. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(f) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
77. W. VA. CODE § 48-3-10 (1992).
78. Roig v. Roig, 364 S.E.2d 794, 798 (W. Va. 1987); Shank v. Shank, 387 S.E.2d
325, 328 (,V. Va. 1989).
79. Robert J. Levy, An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 FAM. L.Q. 147,
152 (1989).
80. 396 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1990).
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property to the marital estate.8' Yet, the court in Koontz failed to ap-
ply its own rebuttable presumption which it had outlined in Whiting v.
Whiting.82 In Whiting, the court acknowledged that when the legisla-
ture enacted the equitable distribution provisions of divorce law, it
abolished the presumption of an interspousal gift in equitable distribu-
tion cases. The court in Whiting went on to state:
We stress that the joint titling of the separate property gives rise only to a
rebuttable presumption of gift to the marital estate. The presumption may
be overcome by a showing that the transferring spouse did not intend to
transfer the property to joint ownership or was induced to do so by fraud,
coercion, duress, or deception.83
If the Koontz court had correctly applied Whiting's rebuttable
presumption, Mr. Koontz would have been awarded the house because
the record showed that the house was jointly titled in order to influ-
ence Mrs. Koontz to provide the money needed to finish the house.
Put another way, the presumption of a gift was overcome by a show-
ing that the transferring spouse did not intend to make a gift to the
marital estate. Mr. Koontz was coerced into the transfer by Mrs.
Koontz's refusal to return funds to the household, unless she received
joint title to the property.84
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals further confused the
issue in Charlton v. Charlton.5 Mr. Charlton had been the primary
financial planner of the family. He handled the investments and pre-
pared the income tax returns; Mrs. Charlton acknowledged her igno-
rance in this area.86 During the marriage, Mrs. Charlton inherited a
substantial sum of money. All of the funds were placed into invest-
ment accounts in the joint name of the parties and were managed by
Mr. Charlton.87 At the time of the divorce, Mr. Charlton sought an
equal division of the inherited funds based upon Whiting-Mr.
81. Id at 442.
82. 396 S.E.2d 413 (W. Va. 1990).
83. Id. at 421.
84. Koontz, 396 S.E.2d at 440.
85. Charlton v. Charlton, 413 S.E.2d 911 (W. Va. 1991).
86. d at 916-17.
87. Id at 913.
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Charlton asserted that Mrs. Charlton had made a gift to him of her
separate property."8
The court determined that Mrs. Charlton had not intended to give
her separate property to the marital estate.89 The court's rationale was
based upon notions of fiduciary trust between a husband and wife. The
court stated:
1. One who receives property from another with whom he has a confiden-
tial relationship has the burden of showing that the transfer was fair and
made with utmost good faith.
2. The relationship between husband and wife is one of confidence and
trust.
3. Where persons occupy a fiduciary or confidential relationship the lack
of independent advice on the part of the person who claims to be disad-
vantaged by the transaction may be a significant factor in a court's evalua-
tion of the overall bona fides of the transaction.'
The court's analysis in Wood v. Wood 1 is in stark contrast to
the Charlton decision. Here, Mrs. Wood had inherited certain stock.
She placed portions of the stock (her separate property) into a jointly
titled account. Later, those funds were used as a down payment on a
home which was jointly titled.92 The court concluded, "Given that
Mrs. Wood's inheritance had been placed in jointly titled investments
before being used as the down payment on the jointly titled marital
house, we find that the circuit court's classification of the marital
house as marital property was justified."'93 Essentially, the Wood court
held that if a showing could be made that a party was coerced into
jointly titling separate property, the presumption of gift to the marital
estate would be overcome. If not, the property would be considered a
gift to the marital estate.94
88. Id. at 915.
89. Id. at 917.
90. Id at 916.
91. 403 S.E.2d 761 (W. Va. 1991).
92. Id at 765.
93. id at 768.
94. Id at 769.
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As these cases indicate, in many instances a spouse does not
intend joint title designation to constitute a gift of separate property to
the marital estate.95 Spouses often hold title as joint tenants to avoid
probate or to simplify tax matters.96 For example, in In re Marriage
of Benz,97 even though Mrs. Benz had placed separate funds into a
joint account, the court ruled that Mrs. Benz had rebutted the presump-
tion of a gift to the marital estate because she demonstrated that she
lacked business acumen, she desired to placate her husband, and she
depended upon his judgment and advice. Therefore, even though her
separate property had initially been transmuted' into marital'property,
she rebutted the presumption of a gift of the separate property to the
marital estate by proving a lack of donative intent.
Rather than require the parties to litigate their intent or whether
one party was induced by fraud, coercion, duress, or deception, the
courts can simply uncommingle the separate and marital assets. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did just that in Shank v.
Shane? 9 and in Hamstead v. Hamstead.1" The court's reasoning and
rationale in these cases complied not only with the statutory definitions
of marital and separate property, 1 ' but it also provided for easy ac-
countability of both types of property without providing a windfall or
unjust enrichment to the noncontributing spouse.
C. Overcoming the Presumption of Equal Division
The West Virginia Legislature has set forth the factors to be used
in making a fair distribution of marital assets in section 48-2-32(c) of
the West Virginia Code. Although under the statute equal division of
marital property is initially presumed to be appropriate, the statute goes
on to list several factors which may make proper an adjustment of the
property division.102 If the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
95. See also Tallman v. Tallman, 396 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1990).
96. Lynam v. Gallagher, 526 A.2d 878 (Del. 1987).
97. In re Marriage of Benz, 518 N.E.2d 1316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
98. Id. at 1319.
99. Shank v. Shank, 387 S.E.2d 325 (W. Va. 1989).
100. Hamstead v. Hamnstead, 400 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 1990).
101. W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2-1(e), 48-2-1(f) (Supp. 1992).
102. The statute states:
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is going to continue to honor its Whiting analysis, it should consider a
solution other than an equal division of marital assets when one party
has clearly contributed separate assets to the marital estate in an effort
to benefit the entire family unit. Although separate property was trans-
muted into marital property, a deviation from the presumption of equal
division is justified pursuant to the specific statutory factors. The court
In the absence of a valid agreement, the court shall presume that all marital prop-
erty is to be divided equally between the parties, but may alter this distribution,
without regard to any attribution of fault to either party which may be alleged or
proved in the course of action, after a consideration of the following:
(1) The extent to which each party has contributed to the acquisition, preser-
vation and maintenance, or increase in value of marital property by monetary
contributions, including, but not limited to:
(A) Employment income and other earnings; and
(3) Funds which are separate property.
(2) The extent to which each party has contributed to the acquisition, preser-
vation and maintenance, or increase in value of marital property by nonmonetary
contributions, including, but not limited to:
(A) Homemaker services;
(B) Child care services;
(C) Labor performed without compensation, or for less than adequate
compensation, in a family business or other business entity in which one or both
of the parties has an interest;
(D) Labor performed in the actual maintenance or improvement of tangi-
ble marital property; and
(E) Labor performed in the management or investment of assets which
are marital property.
(3) The extent to which each party expended his or her efforts during the
marriage in a manner which limited or decreased such party's income-earning
ability or increased the income-earning ability of the other party, including, but not
limited to:
(A) Direct or indirect contributions by either party to the education or
training of the other party which has increased the income-earning ability of such
other party; and
(B) Foregoing by either party of employment or other income-earning
activity through an understanding of the parties or at the instance of the other
party.
(4) The extent to which each party, during the marriage, may have conducted
himself or herself so as to dissipate or depreciate the value of the marital property
of the parties: Provided, That except for a consideration of the economic conse-
quences of conduct as provided for in this subdivision, fault or marital misconduct
shall not be considered by the court in determining the proper distribution of mari-
tal property.
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32(c) (1992).
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should uncommingle the marital and separate property for purposes of
equitable distribution. Support for this proposition is found in many
other jurisdictions. Reasonable standards exist for the division of as-
sets.
Yet, many courts continue to expand the scope of divisible marital
property by creative uses of the notions of commingling and
transmutation."13 While it may be fair for a court to conclude that
separate property has been transmi:Zed into marital property when it is
equitably dividing a marital estate after considering, among other fac-
tors, the contributions of each spouse toward the marital estate,104
some commentators, including Professor Levy, 05 note that the
presumption that a gift has occurred when property has been jointly
titled proposes a per se rule of transmutation. While this presumption
does permit predictability, it also permits transmutation in a number of
situations where an intent to make a gift clearly is absent. The issue
for the court is whether the predictability of the per se rule that the
joint titling of property equals a gift to the marital estate outweighs
unfairness or an unjust enrichment to the noncontributing spouse.
Some courts have concluded that the adoption of equitable distri-
bution has abolished the presumption of a gift from joint title.0' In
these states, title is disregarded. The courts merely assess, at the time
of divorce, the source of the consideration that was used to purchase
the property. 7 Unfortunately, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals' position in Whiting invites litigation over the intent to make
a gift to the marital estate. Of course, the economic realities permit
such litigation only when the amount of the presumed gift is substan-
tial."08 However, when the presumed gift is substantial, it is also
likely that a gift was not intended. While it is reasonable to assert that
during the parties' marriage, the spouse permitted the family unit to
103. See Westbrook v. Westbrook, 364 S.E.2d 523 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
104. See Lambert v. Lambert, 367 S.E.2d 184 (Va. 1988).
105. Levy, supra note 79, at 152.
106. Watson v. Watson, 551 A.2d 505 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Griffith v. Griffith,
415 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
107. MacIntire v. McKay, 539 A.2d 258 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Dorsey v. Dorsey,
487 A.2d 1181 (Md. 1985).
108. Charlton v. Charlton, 413 S.E.2d 911, 917 (W. Va. 1991).
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benefit from his or her property, it is also fair to presume that the
same spouse, upon divorce, would like to retain the property that he or
she contributed. Therefore, at the conclusion of the marriage, the sepa-
rate assets should be uncommingled.
I am not suggesting that the court adopt the "tracing approach"
requested by Mrs. Wood in Wood v. Wood."° In Wood, the court
correctly refused to consider what other courts have called draconian
tracing requirements. For example, in Chenault v. Chenault,"° the
Kentucky Supreme Court recognized that there were simpler and more
equitable ways of ascertaining whether property was nonmarital than
by using the tracing method."'
However, in an effort to avoid a windfall to the noncontributing
spouse, the court should not pigeonhole assets, but should use all the
factors contained in section 48-2-32(c) to reach a fair division of the
marital assets after separate property has been transmuted or commin-
gled into the marital estate. In essence, this permits a court to make
additional provisions for a dependent spouse and allows the spouse
who contributed separate assets to the marital estate to receive a credit
or an offset for those contributions. While this may result in the exer-
cise of a court's discretion, it also prevents a windfall to a noncontrib-
uting spouse who received the benefits of the separate assets during
the marriage.
Although some commentators have concluded that such a division
will promote arbitrary results, the inequities which may result to either
the husband or wife under the current approach in West Virginia seem
to outweigh the chance of an abuse of judicial discretion under the
proposed model." 2 While the proposed model does not totally elimi-
nate the possibility of judicial arbitrariness, the trial courts can be
required to consider the statutory factnrs and to explain with specificity
the reasoning used to divide the marital estate.
109. 403 S.E.2d 761, 767 (W. Va. 1991).
110. See Chenault v. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1990).
111. See id at 578.
112. MARY A. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 64 (1981); Mary
A. Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion In Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law,
60 TUL. L. REV. 1165 (1986).
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is reasonable for courts to conclude that spouses, during a mar-
riage, conduct themselves under the assumption that the marriage will
continue forever. However, when that does not occur, courts must be
prepared to fashion a division of property that is fair and equitable for
both parties. In doing so, the courts must properly apply and utilize all
statutory provisions and criteria. Although this approach may require
more thought and analysis and may be more time consuming due to
an increased requirement for specific reasoning, such a framework
would provide a fair and reasonable division of the marital estate
which leaves the parties in relatively equal financial positions.
In light of this analysis, I suggest that the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals attempt, when considering divorce actions, to return
to each spouse the value of his or her premarriage accumulations and
any gifts and inheritance, unless an intent to transmute the property is
clear and the assistance of uncommingling is unavailable.113 Finally,
creative utilization of all of the domestic relations statutes is necessary
when courts award alimony and apply the equitable distribution stat-
utes. Thus, a little uncornmingling, as well as commingling of the two
concepts is necessary to achieve the fair and equitable results intended
by the legislature.
113. J. Thomas Oldham, Is the Concept of Marital Property Outdated?, 22 J. PAM. L.
263 (1983-84); see also J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling and Transmutation, 23
FAM. L.Q. 219 (1989).
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